@article {43,
	title = {Buy-it-now or Take-a-chance: Price Discrimination through Randomized Auctions},
	journal = {Management Science},
	volume = {60},
	number = {12},
	year = {2014},
	pages = {2927 - 2948},
	abstract = {Increasingly detailed consumer information makes sophisticated price discrimination possible. At fine levels of aggregation, demand may not obey standard regularity conditions. We propose a new randomized sales mechanism for such environments. Bidders can "buy-it-now" at a posted price, or "take-a-chance" in an auction where the top d \&gt; 1 bidders are equally likely to win. The randomized allocation incentivizes high valuation bidders to buy-it-now. We analyze equilibrium behavior, and apply our analysis to advertiser bidding data from Microsoft Advertising Exchange. In counterfactual simulations, our mechanism increases revenue by 4.4\% and consumer surplus by 14.5\% compared to an optimal second-price auction.},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2009},
	author = {L. Elisa  Celis and Gregory Lewis and Markus Mobius and Hamid Nazerzadeh}
}
