@proceedings {46,
	title = {Buy-it-now or Take-a-chance: A Simple Sequential Screening Mechanism},
	journal = {Proceedings of the 20th international conference on World wide web},
	volume = {WWW {\textquoteright}11},
	number = {March 2011},
	year = {2011},
	pages = {147-156},
	publisher = {International World Wide Web Conference Committee},
	address = {Hyderabad, India},
	abstract = {We present a simple auction mechanism which extends the second-price auction with reserve and is truthful in expectation. This mechanism is particularly effective in private value environments where the distribution of valuations are irregular. Bidders can {\textquotedblleft}buy-it-now{\textquotedblright}, or alternatively {\textquotedblleft}takea- chance{\textquotedblright} where the top d bidders are equally likely to win. The randomized take-a-chance allocation incentivizes high valuation bidders to buy-it-now. We show that for a large class of valuations, this mechanism achieves similar allocations and revenues as Myerson{\textquoteright}s optimal mechanism, and outperforms the second-price auction with reserve. In addition, we present an evaluation of bid data from Microsoft{\textquoteright}s AdECN platform. We find the valuations are irregular, and counterfactual experiments suggest our BINTAC mechanism would improve revenue by 11\% relative to an optimal second-price mechanism with reserve.},
	url = {https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1963429},
	author = {L. Elisa  Celis and Gregory Lewis and Markus Mobius and Hamid Nazerzadeh}
}
