<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">L. Elisa  Celis</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gregory Lewis</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Markus Mobius</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hamid Nazerzadeh</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Buy-it-now or Take-a-chance: Price Discrimination through Randomized Auctions</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Management Science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2014</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2009</style></url></web-urls></urls><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">60</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2927 - 2948</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Increasingly detailed consumer information makes sophisticated price discrimination possible. At fine levels of aggregation, demand may not obey standard regularity conditions. We propose a new randomized sales mechanism for such environments. Bidders can &quot;buy-it-now&quot; at a posted price, or &quot;take-a-chance&quot; in an auction where the top d &amp;gt; 1 bidders are equally likely to win. The randomized allocation incentivizes high valuation bidders to buy-it-now. We analyze equilibrium behavior, and apply our analysis to advertiser bidding data from Microsoft Advertising Exchange. In counterfactual simulations, our mechanism increases revenue by 4.4% and consumer surplus by 14.5% compared to an optimal second-price auction.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">12</style></issue></record></records></xml>