<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Attila Ambrus</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Markus Mobius</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Adam Szeidl</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Consumption Risk-sharing in Social Networks</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">American Economic Review</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2014</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.1.149</style></url></web-urls></urls><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">104</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">149-82</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">We develop a model in which connections between individuals serve as social collateral to enforce informal insurance payments. We show that: (1) The degree of insurance is governed by the expansiveness of the network, measured with the per capita number of connections that groups have with the rest of the community. Two-dimensional networks---like real-world networks in Peruvian villages---are sufficiently expansive to allow very good risk-sharing. (2) In second-best arrangements, insurance is local: agents fully share shocks within, but imperfectly between endogenously emerging risk-sharing groups. We also discuss how endogenous social collateral affects our results. (JEL D02, D31, D70)</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record></records></xml>