<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>10</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">L. Elisa  Celis</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gregory Lewis</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Markus Mobius</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hamid Nazerzadeh</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Buy-it-now or Take-a-chance: A Simple Sequential Screening Mechanism</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Proceedings of the 20th international conference on World wide web</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1963429</style></url></web-urls></urls><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">International World Wide Web Conference Committee</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hyderabad, India</style></pub-location><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">WWW '11</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">147-156</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">We present a simple auction mechanism which extends the second-price auction with reserve and is truthful in expectation. This mechanism is particularly effective in private value environments where the distribution of valuations are irregular. Bidders can “buy-it-now”, or alternatively “takea- chance” where the top d bidders are equally likely to win. The randomized take-a-chance allocation incentivizes high valuation bidders to buy-it-now. We show that for a large class of valuations, this mechanism achieves similar allocations and revenues as Myerson’s optimal mechanism, and outperforms the second-price auction with reserve. In addition, we present an evaluation of bid data from Microsoft’s AdECN platform. We find the valuations are irregular, and counterfactual experiments suggest our BINTAC mechanism would improve revenue by 11% relative to an optimal second-price mechanism with reserve.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">March 2011</style></issue></record></records></xml>