<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Drew Fudenberg</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Markus Mobius</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Adam Szeidl</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Journal of Economic Theory</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2007</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.07.014</style></url></web-urls></urls><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">133</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">550-567</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">We show the existence of a pure strategy, symmetric, increasing equilibrium in double auction markets with correlated, conditionally independent private values and many participants. The equilibrium we find is arbitrarily close to fully revealing as the market size grows. Our results provide strategic foundations for price-taking behavior in large markets.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record></records></xml>