<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Glenn Ellison</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Drew Fudenberg</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Markus Mobius</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Competing Auctions</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Journal of European Economic Association</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2004</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">https://doi.org/10.1162/154247604323015472</style></url></web-urls></urls><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">30-66</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This paper examines a simple model of competing auction sites to give some insights into the concentration of auction markets. In our model, there are B ex-ante identical buyers, each with unit demand, and S sellers, each with a single unit of the good to sell and a reservation value of zero. At the start of the model, buyers and sellers simultaneously choose between two possible locations. Buyers then learn their private values for the good, and a uniform-price auction is held at each location. This is a very stark model, but we believe that it provides some useful insights, and that it serves as a benchmark case for richer and more realistic models.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record></records></xml>