## Experimental Instructions

This appendix contains all the experimental instructions for the dictator games and the helping game. While we refer to our subjects as decision makers and partners for clarity of exposition in the text, in the actual experiment subjects were referred to as Player 1 and Player 2.

Dictator Games:

- Network Elicitation
- Decision Maker Screens - Nameless Partner
- Decision Maker Screens - Named Partner
- Partner Screens - Named Partner

Helping Game:

- Decision Maker Screens - Nameless Partner
- Decision Maker Screens - Named Partner

In order to protect our subjects' privacy we replaced all last names on the following sample screen shots with fictitious last names. This applies to all screen shots where decision makers were asked to make decisions for named partners or where partners were asked to report expectations for named decision makers.

## Dictator Games

The following instructions are included:

- Network Elicitation
- Decision Maker Screens - Nameless Partner
- Decision Maker Screens - Named Partner
- Partner Screens - Named Partner

Decision makers made decisions for nameless and named partners one week apart.

We used a within-subject design where each decision maker made decisions for each partner both anonymously and non-anonymously (same for eliciting partners' expectations). We randomized the order in which these two treatments were presented to subjects. The order was consistent for both parts of the experiment (nameless and named decisions). 50 percent of subjects made first the anonymous and then the non-anonymous decision for each partner and 50 percent of subjects made decisions the other way round. The sample screen shots only show one possible order in all cases.

The named decisions were presented to subjects in two possible ways. Either a subject was asked to list her anonymous and non-anonymous decisions for each named partner on the same screen or a subject was asked to make all the anonymous decisions and non-anonymous decisions on two separate screens. We assigned one of the two versions to each subject with equal probability.

Partners were presented in random order to decision makers. Decision makers were presented in random order to partners when eliciting expectations.

## House Experiment




 of our study.

## House Experiment

## Earn \$\$ and Win Valuable Prizes

You have been invited to participate in a study on economic decision making. A major aim of the study is to improve public health policies. The study consists of a main survey and two short follow-up surveys in the spring semester. You have just started the main survey which is expected to take 15-20 minutes.
 2003. You can also win additional money from decisions you will take during the main survey ranging from $\$ 0$ to $\$ 5$. These winnings will be paid out to you together with your base reward by December 31, 2003. We will invite you again in the spring semester to participate in two follow-up surveys. If you choose to participate in them you will receive $\$ 5$ within a month after taking each of the two surveys.

On top of this, you will also be automatically enrolled in a raffle where you can win valuable prizes if you complete both this main survey and the follow-ups. Your odds of winning some prize in our raffle are at least 1 in 3 , the minimum value of a prize is $\$ 12$ and the expected winnings are at least $\$ 8$. The winners of our raffle will be announced before June 1,2004 . A detailed description of the prizes is given below. Winners can claim a monetary reward (the cash equivalent) instead of the prize except the two main prizes which have to be redeemed in the form of vouchers to pay for airline tickets (see here for further details on the raffle).


## House Experiment

## Informed Consent Form

## Please check the checkbox at the end of this page if you agree with the contents of the consent form (below on yellow background). This will indicate that

 you formally consent to participate in our study.Professors Michael Kremer and Markus Mobius of Harvard University and Tanya Rosenblat of Wesleyan University are conducting this study to learn more about how people make decisions in economic environments. A major aim of the study is to improve public health policies. You are invited to participate in this study if you are a Harvard undergraduate student in your sophomore, junior or senior year. The experiments will not involve deception in any way.
The main study will be conducted over the web and in three parts. The first part will start right after you review this consent form and is expected to take about 15-20 minutes. You will be asked to fill out a questionnaire to provide us with some background information about yourself. We will also ask you and other participants to make a series of decisions, and your own and other participants' decisions will determine your earnings. We will contact you again in May 2004 for a follow-up survey which is expected to take no more than 10-15 minutes. You will be paid a separate participation fee for that part of the study and you can discontinue your participation at any point in time.

We may invite you to a special study in December or January. You will be separately compensated for that study.
For participating in this experiment you will receive the following payments:

1. For completing the first part you will receive a participation fee of $\$ 10$ which will be added to your Crimson Cash ${ }^{2}$ R3 minimum compensation you will receive for participating in the experiment.
2. You can earn additional money ranging from $\$ 0$ to $\$ 5$ from the specific decisions you make during the first part of our study. Those winnings will be added to your Crimson

3. For completing each of the follow-up surveys next semester you will receive another participation reward of $\$ 5$ within one month of taking the follow-up survey.
4. On top of this, you will also be automatically enrolled in a raffle where you can win valuable prizes if you complete both this main survey and the follow-ups. Your odds of
$\quad$ Please check this box if you agree with the terms and conditions of the experiment.

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## House Experiment

## Please select your house, your class and your name from the following drop-down menus. Your participation fees and your winnings will be added to your Crimson Cash account.

```
A numeric ID will be automatically created for each participant and everyone's answers will always be linked to their numeric ID for privacy protection. All collected data will be stored securely.
```


## Personal Information

In order to protect your privacy we only provide first names and initials of the last name.
Your house: Lowell $\quad$ Your class: Class of 2004 $\quad$ - $\quad$ Your name: Raphael S. $\quad-$

You may have received a promotion code. If you type in this code you will increase the winnings of the code's sender but will not affect your winnings. If you have not received a promotion code you can leave the field empty.

## Promotion code (if available):

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## House Experiment

## Naming Game

We will now ask you to play a game with other participants in the experiment. Remember that all sophomores, juniors and seniors of Kirkland and Lowell houses are invited to participate in this study. If you follow instructions you can earn cash which will be added to your Crimson Cash Mildedin account in addition to your participation reward.

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## House Experiment

## Naming Game Instructions

On the next two screens, please select the names of ten Harvard friends OTHER THAN YOUR ROOMMATES who are sophomores, juniors or seniors at Kirkland or Lowell houses, the two houses in this study. To protect the privacy of your friends, we will only list the first names and first initials of the last and middle names of members of each house and their graduation year. All other participants in this study will also be asked to name $\mathbf{1 0}$ friends.

For each of the ten names we will also ask you how much time you spent with this person during the typical week of this semester so far ( $0-30 \mathrm{~min}, 30 \mathrm{~min}-1$ hour, 2-4 hours, 4-8 hours, more than $\mathbf{8}$ hours). Only count time spent one-on-one or in small social gatherings (do not include classes).

If you list some friend who also completes the survey and lists you as well a fair coin will be flipped using a computer random number generator. With 50 percent probability you will receive a prize of $\$ 0.50$ and $\$ 0.00$ otherwise. If both of you also agree on the amount of time spent together each week your winning probability will increase to 75 percent. If you name a person who does not name you will received nothing. Since you are allowed to name up to ten individuals, you have ten independent chances to win $\$ 0.50$.

In order to maximize your winnings, think carefully about the names you enter on the list.

## Your answers will be linked to the numeric ID variables of the listed friends and NOT to their names.

## Your list of names will remain strictly confidential and will be never revealed to anybody, including the individuals on the list.

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## House Experiment

## Select Friends

Please select five friends (except room mates) at Kirkland or Lowell houses. Please first choose the Harvard house in the left drop-down menu, then the graduation year of your friend in the second drop-down menu (class of 2004-2006) and finally the name in the third drop-down menu.

In the fourth drop-down menu indicate how much time you spent with this person during the typical week of this semester so far. Only count time spent one-on-one or in small social gatherings (do not include classes).

On the next screen you can select five more friends.


## House Experiment

Select Friends
Please select the next five friends (except room mates) at Kirkland or Lowell houses.


Your answers will be linked to a numeric ID variable and not to your name. All your replies will be kept strictly confidential.

## Questionaire - Demographic and Socio-Economic Background

In the following screens you will be asked basic questions about your demographic and socio-economic background.
What is the highest degree of education of your parents?

| Mother |  |  | Grammar School or High School | High School Graduate | Postsecondary School other than College | O Some college | College degree | O Some graduate school | O Medical school | $\begin{array}{\|c} \text { OLaw } \\ \text { school } \end{array}$ | O Other graduate degree |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Father |  |  | Grammar School or High School | High <br> School Graduate | Postsecondary School other than College | O Some college | College degree | Some graduate school | O Medical school | $\left\lvert\, \begin{gathered} \text { OLaw } \\ \text { school } \end{gathered}\right.$ | O Other graduate degree |
| Next Question >> | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |  | 5 | 6 |  | 7 |  | 8 |

Dictator Games - Network Elicitation
House Experiment
Your answers will be linked to a numeric ID variable and not to your name. All your replies will be kept strictly confidential.

## Questionaire - Life at Harvard

In the following screens you will be asked questions about life as a Harvard student.

| On an average day, about how many hours do you watch television? |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| - I don't watch TV |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| - 30 min or less |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| - 30 min to 1 hour |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| - 1 hour to 1 hour 30 min |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| - 1 hour 30 min to 2 hours |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| - 2 hours to 2 hours 30 min |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| - 2 hours 30 min to 3 hours |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| - 3 hours to 3 hours 30 min |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| - 3 hours 30 min to 4 hours |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| - more than 4 hours |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| << Previous Question Next Question >> | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |

## House Experiment - Game Phase - Part A <br> Instructions - Page 1

This is the second and final stage of an ongoing experiment about decision-making (the first stage took place last December). Once you complete this stage you will be eligible to win valuable prizes in our large raffle, including a trip to Europe (one per house), dinners for two, movie tickets for two etc. The probability of winning is higher than one in three and your expected earnings are at least $\$ 8$. On top of this you can earn up to $\$ 15$ from the decisions you make. A research foundation has provided the funds for this experiment.
This stage of the experiment consists of two parts (part A and part B). You will play the first part now. You will receive an email invitation to the second part of the experiment in about 7 days. Both parts of the experiment together should take about 10-15 minutes of your time (including reading the instructions).

## We will record your data only under an anonymous numeric identifier and we will keep your data confidential. In order to keep your decisions private, please do not reveal your choices to any other participant.

Dictator Games - Decision Maker Screens (Nameless Partner)

## House Experiment - Game Phase - Part A <br> Instructions - Page 2

You are asked to make a series of choices about how to divide a set of tokens between yourself (PLAYER 1) and one other student in your house (PLAYER 2). As you divide the tokens, you and the other subject will each earn points. Every point that subjects earn will be worth 10 cents. For example, if you earn 58 points you will make $\$ 5.80$ in the experiment.

## Each choice you make is similar to the following:

Divide 70 tokens: Hold __ @ 1 point each, and Pass ___ @ 2 points each.
In this choice you must divide 70 tokens. You can keep all the tokens, keep some and pass some, or pass all the tokens. In this example, you will receive 1 point for every token you hold, and the other player will receive 2 points for every token you pass.

Example 1 (cont.):If you hold 70 and pass 0 tokens, you will receive 70 points, or $70 \times \$ 0.10=\$ 7.00$, and the other player will receive no points and $\$ 0$. If you hold 0 tokens and pass 70 , you will receive $\$ 0$ and the other player will receive $70 \times 2=140$ points, or $140 \times \$ 0.10=\$ 14.00$. However, you could choose any number between 0 and 70 to hold. For instance, you could choose to hold 39 tokens and pass 31 . In this case you would earn 39 points, or $39 \mathrm{x} \$ 0.10=\$ 3.90$, and the other subject would receive $31 \mathrm{x} 2=62$ points, that is 62 x \$0.10 = \$6.20.

Example 2:
Divide 40 tokens: Hold __ @ 3 point each, and Pass ___ @ 1 points each.
In this example every token you hold earns you 3 points, and every token you pass ear ns the other subject 1 point. Again, each point you earn is worth $\$ 0.10$ to you, and each point the other subject earns is worth $\$ 0.10$ to the other subject.

| $\ll$ Previous Page | Next Page>> | $\mathbf{1}$ | $\mathbf{2}$ |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

Dictator Games - Decision Maker Screens (Nameless Partner)

## House Experiment - Game Phase - Part A

## Earning Money

Last December, about 300 students in your house participated in our study. Half of these students are now invited to play the role of player 1 and to make decisions about allocating tokens, just as you do. The other half of these students play the role of player 2 and receive tokens.

In the following we explain step by step how your earnings today are determined.

```
Goto Step 1
```

| << Previous Page | Next Page >> |
| :--- | :--- |

## Earning Money

Last December, about 300 students in your house participated in our study. Half of these students are now invited to play the role of player 1 and to make decisions about allocating tokens, just as you do. The other half of these students play the role of player 2 and receive tokens.

In the following we explain step by step how your earnings today are determined.

```
1.,YOU play with TWO
    players.
```

- Today we match you with TWO other players in your house.
- For each player we ask you to make THREE decisions.
- Next week when you play part B you will make similar decisions for a different set of player 2 's from your house.
- After you have made your decisions for both players and after you have completed part B of the experiment in about 7 days a computer program will randomly select exactly one of the decisions that you are making today or next week for payment.
- The program ensures that each player 1 is matched with one and only one player 2 during the course of this experiment.
- Today's and next week's earnings will be added to your Crimson Cash account after you have completed both parts of the experiment.
- Alternatively, we are happy to send a check to you: if you are a senior this will be the default option. At the end of the second part of this experiment we will ask for a mailing address in case you want a with your earnings mailed to you. Please email Professor Mobius directly if you do not receive a check within the first week of J une.


## We will pay you in a timely manner!

- To protect your privacy your earnings will be compiled by a computer program using your Harvard ID number as a reference, and your earnings will be transmitted electronically to the Crimson Card office to be fed into a database.
- None of the experimenters or their research assistant will ever see the earnings of any particular student.

| $\ll$ Previous Page | Next Page >> | $\mathbf{1}$ | $\mathbf{2}$ |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

Dictator Games - Decision Maker Screens (Nameless Partner)
House Experiment - Game Phase - Part A

## Make Your Decisions For First Other Player

On the next page you are playing against the first player and we ask you to make three choices. Please note the following:

1. The other player is RANDOMLY SELECTED amongst about $\mathbf{1 5 0}$ students in Lowell house. You will not be told the identity of the other player during the experiment or at any time afterwards.
2. The other player WI LL NOT FIND OUT your identity at any time during or after the experiment.

| << Previous Page | Next Page >> |
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1
2

Dictator Games - Decision Maker Screens (Nameless Partner)
House Experiment - Game Phase - Part A

## Make Your Decisions For First Other Player

The other player is RANDOMLY SELECTED amongst about 150 students in Lowell house. You will not be told the identity of the other player during the experiment or at any time afterwards. The other player WI LL NOT FI ND OUT your identity at any time during or after the experiment.

Please fill in the blanks below. Make sure the number of tokens listed under Hold plus the number of tokens listed under Pass equals the total number of tokens available. Remember, all points are worth $\$ 0.10$ to all subjects. Also remember that if the match with this player is implemented one of your three decisions will be selected at random.

2.

Divide 50 tokens: Hold 50
50 • @ 2 points each, and Pass 0 0 @ 2 points each
3.

Divide 50 tokens: Hold 50 @ 1 point each, and Pass $\square$ @ 3 points each

| $\ll$ Previous Page | Next Page >> | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

Dictator Games - Decision Maker Screens (Nameless Partner)
House Experiment - Game Phase - Part A

## Make Your Decisions For Second Other Player

On the next page you are playing against the second player and we ask you to make three choices. Please note the following:

1. The other player is RANDOMLY SELECTED amongst amongst about 150 students in Lowell house. You will not be told the identity of the other player during the experiment or at any time afterwards.
2. The other player WILL BE TOLD about your identity when he or she is informed about his or her earnings at the end of the experiment.

Dictator Games - Decision Maker Screens (Nameless Partner)
House Experiment - Game Phase - Part A

## Make Your Decisions For Second Other Player

The other player is RANDOMLY SELECTED amongst amongst about $\mathbf{1 5 0}$ students in Lowell house. You will not be told the identity of the other player during the experiment or at any time afterwards. The other player WILL BE TOLD about your identity when he is informed about his earnings at the end of the experiment.

Please fill in the blanks below. Make sure the number of tokens listed under Hold plus the number of tokens listed under Pass equals the total number of tokens available. Remember, all points are worth $\mathbf{\$ 0 . 1 0}$ to all subjects. Also remember that if the match with this player is implemented one of your three decisions will be selected at random.
1.

Divide 50 tokens: Hold 50@ 3 points each, and Pass 0 0 $\qquad$ - @ 1 point each
2. Divide 50 tokens: Hold 50 $\qquad$ @ 2 points each, and Pass 0 $\qquad$ @ 2 points each
3.

Divide 50 tokens: Hold 50 $\square$ @ 1 point each, and Pass 0 $\rightarrow$ @ 3 points each

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Dictator Games - Decision Maker Screens (Nameless Partner)

## House Experiment - Game Phase - Part A

## First Part of Experiment is Finished

Thank you for participating in the first part of the experiment.
We will contact you in about 7 days for the second part of this experiment. After you have completed both parts we will transfer your earnings from the first and second part to your Crimson Cash account caldsom by May 30, 2004. You will also be eligible to win one of our
valuable prizes which will be drawn by May 30 as well.
Have a nice day!

Dictator Games - Decision Maker Screens (Named Partner - anon/non-anon. comparison on same screen)

## House Experiment - Game Phase <br> Instructions - Page 1

Welcome back to the second part of our experiment.

> | $\begin{array}{l}\text { We will record your data only under an anonymous numeric identifier and we will keep your } \\ \text { data confidential. In order to keep your decisions private, please do not reveal your choices } \\ \text { to any other participant. }\end{array}$ |
| :--- |

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| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

Dictator Games - Decision Maker Screens (Named Partner - anon/non-anon. comparison on same screen)
House Experiment - Game Phase
Instructions - Page 2

## The instructions differ slightly from last time. Please read carefully.

You are asked to make a series of choices about how to divide a set of tokens between yourself (PLAYER 1) and one other student in your house (PLAYER 2). As you divide the tokens, you and the other subject will each earn points. Every point that subjects earn will be worth 10 cents. For example, if you earn 58 points you will make $\$ 5.80$ in the experiment.

Each choice you make is similar to the following:
Divide 70 tokens: Hold $\qquad$ @ 1 point each, and Pass $\qquad$ @ 2 points each.

In this choice you must divide 70 tokens. You can keep all the tokens, keep some and pass some, or pass all the tokens. In this example, you will receive 1 point for every token you hold, and the other player will receive $\mathbf{2}$ points for every token you pass.

Example 1 (cont.):If you hold 70 and pass 0 tokens, you will receive 70 points, or $70 \mathrm{x} \$ 0.10=\$ 7.00$, and the other player will receive no points and $\$ 0$. If you hold 0 tokens and pass 70 , you will receive $\$ 0$ and the other player will receive $70 \times 2=140$ points, or $140 \times \$ 0.10=\$ 14.00$. However, you could choose any number between 0 and 70 to hold. For instance, you could choose to hold 39 tokens and pass 31 . In this case you would earn 39 points, or $39 \times \$ 0.10=\$ 3.90$, and the other subject would receive $31 \times 2=62$ points, that is 62 x \$0.10 = \$6.20.

## Example 2:

Divide 40 tokens: Hold $\qquad$ 3 point each, and Pass @ 1 points each.
In this example every token you hold earns you 3 points, and every token you pass ear ns the other subject 1 point. Again, each point you earn is worth $\$ 0.10$ to you, and each point the other subject earns is worth $\$ 0.10$ to the other subject.

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Dictator Games - Decision Maker Screens (Named Partner - anon/non-anon. comparison on same screen)

## House Experiment - Game Phase

## Earning Money

## The instructions differ slightly from last time. Please read carefully.

Last December, about 300 students in your house participated in our study. Half of these students are now invited to play the role of player 1 and to make decisions about allocating tokens, just as you do. The other half of these students play the role of player $\mathbf{2}$ and receive tokens.

In the following we explain step by step how your earnings today are determined.

```
Goto Step 1
```

| $\ll$ Previous Page | Next Page $\gg$ | $\mathbf{1}$ | $\mathbf{2}$ | $\mathbf{3}$ | 4 |
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Dictator Games - Decision Maker Screens (Named Partner - anon/non-anon. comparison on same screen)
House Experiment - Game Phase

## Earning Money

## The instructions differ slightly from last time. Please read carefully.

Last December, about 300 students in your house participated in our study. Half of these students are now invited to play the role of player 1 and to make decisions about allocating tokens, just as you do. The other half of these students play the role of player $\mathbf{2}$ and receive tokens.

In the following we explain step by step how your earnings today are determined.

```
1.,YOU play with FI VE
    players.
```


## 2. At most ONE decision is randomly selected.

- Today we match you with FI VE other players in your house.
- For each player we ask you to make a number of decisions.
- After you have made your decisions for all players, a computer program will randomly exactly one of the decisions that you are making today or that you made last week for payment.
- The program ensures that each player 1 is matched with one and only one player 2 during the course of this experiment.
- Your earnings from this experiment will be added to your Crimson Cash.
- Alternatively, we are happy to send a check to you: if you are a senior this will be the default option. At the end of the second part of this experiment we will ask for a mailing address in case you want a check with your earnings mailed to you. Please email Professor Mobius directly if you do not receive a check within the first week of J une.


## We will pay you in a timely manner!

- To protect your privacy your earnings will be compiled by a computer program using your Harvard ID number as a reference, and your earnings will be transmitted electronically to the Crimson Card office to be fed into a database.
- None of the experimenters or their research assistant will ever see the earnings of any particular student.

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Dictator Games - Decision Maker Screens (Named Partner - anon/non-anon. comparison on same screen)

## House Experiment - Game Phase <br> Make your DECISI ONS

On each of the following five pages we present you with a different player 2 from Kirkland house. Please make THREE decisions for allocating tokens between yourself and that player for each of the following two situations:

- In the first situation PLAYER 2 WILL FIND OUT
your identity and the selected decision when he or she receives earnings. We will also inform you about the selected decision and about the identity of player 2 when we pay your earnings.
- In the second situation PLAYER 2 WILL NOT FIND OUT
your identity when he or she receives earnings. We will also NOT inform you about the selected decision and about the identity of player 2 when we pay your earnings.


## Of all the player 2's in the following pages AT MOST ONE player 2 in ONE situation will be chosen at random and ONE of the corresponding decisions you

 have made for allocating tokens between yourself and that player will be implemented.Example:The computer might pick your match with JANE SMITH from Kirkland house in a situation where JANE does NOT KNOW that you allocate tokens for her. Amongst the three decisions you made for JANE the computer might use the decision where you alloc ated tokens which are worth 3 points to you and 1 point to JANE. Assume you decided to hold 10 tokens and pass 40 tokens to JANE. Then you will receive $10 x 3 x \$ 0.10=\$ 3.00$ and JANE will receive $40 \times \$ 0.10=\$ 4.00$. In this situation neither JANE nor you will be informed by us that this decision was selected for calculating your earnings.

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Dictator Games - Decision Maker Screens (Named Partner - anon/non-anon. comparison on same screen)

## House Experiment - Game Phase

## Make Your Decisions For First Other Player ( 1 out of 5)

Please fill in the blanks below. Remember, all points are worth $\$ 0.10$ to all subjects. Also remember that if the match with this player is implemented one of your three decisions in one of the two situations will be selected.

Press HERE to Start

Dictator Games - Decision Maker Screens (Named Partner - anon/non-anon. comparison on same screen)
House Experiment - Game Phase

## Make Your Decisions For First Other Player (1 out of 5)

Please fill in the blanks below. Remember, all points are worth $\mathbf{\$ 0 . 1 0}$ to all subjects. Also remember that if the match with this player is implemented one of your three decisions in one of the two situations will be selected.

YOU divide 50 tokens between yourself and STEVEN MOSHNIK.

| First Situation: | STEVEN WILL FIND OUT that you allocated tokens for him when he receives his earnings and observes the number of points he received from the match with you. We will also inform you which of your decisions determined your earnings nor that a decision for STEVEN was selected for payment |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Decision 1: | Divide 50 tokens: Hold ${ }^{28}$ | - @ 3 points each, and Pass 22 | - @ 1 point each |
| Decision 2: | Divide 50 tokens: Hold 27 | - @ 1 point each, and Pass 23 | - @ 3 points each |
|  | Divide 50 tokens: Hold $\sqrt{26}$ | - @ 2 points each, and Pass $\sqrt{24}$ | - @ 2 points each |

Goto second situation

Dictator Games - Decision Maker Screens (Named Partner - anon/non-anon. comparison on same screen)

## House Experiment - Game Phase

## Make Your Decisions For First Other Player (1 out of 5)

Please fill in the blanks below. Remember, all points are worth $\mathbf{\$ 0 . 1 0}$ to all subjects. Also remember that if the match with this player is implemented one of your three decisions in one of the two situations will be selected.

YOU divide 50 tokens between yourself and STEVEN MOSHNIK.

| First Situation: | STEVEN WI LL FIND OUT that you allocated tokens for him when he receives his earnings and observes the number of points he received from the match with you. We will also NOT inform you which of your decisions determined your earnings nor that a decision for STEVEN was selected for payment |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Decision 1: | Divide 50 tokens: Hold 28 | - @ 3 points each, and Pass 22 | - @ 1 point each |
| Decision 2 | Divide 50 tokens: Hold 27 | - @ 1 point each, and Pass 23 | - @ 3 points each |
| Decision 3: | Divide 50 tokens: Hold 26 | - @ 2 points each, and Pass 24 | - @ 2 points each |


| Second Situation: | STEVEN WI LL NOT FIND OUT that you allocated tokens for him when he receives his earnings and observes the number of points he received from the match with you. We will also NOT inform you which of your decisions determined your earnings and that a decision for STEVEN was selected for payment. |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Decision 1: | Divide 50 tokens: Hold 22 | - @ 3 points each, and Pass 28 | - @ 1 point each |
| Decision 2: | Divide 50 tokens: Hold 22 | - @ 1 point each, and Pass 28 | - @ 3 points each |
| Decision | Divide 50 tokens: Hold 21 | - @ 2 points each, and Pass 29 | - @ 2 points each |


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Dictator Games - Decision Maker Screens (Named Partner - anon/non-anon. comparison on same screen)

## House Experiment - Game Phase

## Make Your Decisions For Second Other Player (2 out of 5)

Please fill in the blanks below. Remember, all points are worth $\$ 0.10$ to all subjects. Also remember that if the match with this player is implemented one of your three decisions in one of the two situations will be selected.

YOU divide 50 tokens between yourself and CHARLES WOOLWENT.

| First Situation: | CHARLES WILL FIND OUT that you allocated tokens for him when he receives his earnings and observes the number of points he received from the match with you. We will also inform you which of your decisions determined your earnings nor that a decision for CHARLES was selected for payment |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Decision 1: | Divide 50 tokens: Hold 28 | - @ 3 points each, and Pass 22 | - @ 1 point each |
| Decision 2 | Divide 50 tokens: Hold 27 | - @ 1 point each, and Pass 23 | - @ 3 points each |
| Decision 3: | Divide 50 tokens: Hold 23 | - @ 2 points each, and Pass 27 | - @ 2 points each |


| Second Situation: | CHARLES WILL NOT FIND OUT that you allocated tokens for him when he receives his earnings and observes the number of points he received from the match with you. We will also NOT inform you which of your decisions determined your earnings and that a decision for CHARLES was selected for payment. |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Decision 1 | Divide 50 tokens: Hold 27 | - @ 3 points each, and Pass 23 | - @ 1 point each |
| Decision 2 | Divide 50 tokens: Hold 24 | - @ 1 point each, and Pass 26 | - @ 3 points each |
| Decision 3: | Divide 50 tokens: Hold 25 | - @ 2 points each, and Pass 25 | - @ 2 points each |


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Dictator Games - Decision Maker Screens (Named Partner - anon/non-anon. comparison on two screens)

## House Experiment - Game Phase <br> Instructions - Page 1

Welcome back to the second part of our experiment.

> | We will record your data only under an anonymous numeric identifier and we will keep your |
| :--- |
| data confidential. In order to keep your decisions private, please do not reveal your choices |
| to any other participant. |

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Dictator Games - Decision Maker Screens (Named Partner - anon/non-anon. comparison on two screens)
House Experiment - Game Phase
Instructions - Page 2

## The instructions differ slightly from last time. Please read carefully.

You are asked to make a series of choices about how to divide a set of tokens between yourself (PLAYER 1) and one other student in your house (PLAYER 2). As you divide the tokens, you and the other subject will each earn points. Every point that subjects earn will be worth 10 cents. For example, if you earn 58 points you will make $\$ 5.80$ in the experiment.

Each choice you make is similar to the following:
Divide 70 tokens: Hold $\qquad$ @ 1 point each, and Pass $\qquad$ @ 2 points each.

In this choice you must divide 70 tokens. You can keep all the tokens, keep some and pass some, or pass all the tokens. In this example, you will receive 1 point for every token you hold, and the other player will receive $\mathbf{2}$ points for every token you pass.

Example 1 (cont.):If you hold 70 and pass 0 tokens, you will receive 70 points, or $70 \mathrm{x} \$ 0.10=\$ 7.00$, and the other player will receive no points and $\$ 0$. If you hold 0 tokens and pass 70 , you will receive $\$ 0$ and the other player will receive $70 \times 2=140$ points, or $140 \times \$ 0.10=\$ 14.00$. However, you could choose any number between 0 and 70 to hold. For instance, you could choose to hold 39 tokens and pass 31 . In this case you would earn 39 points, or $39 \times \$ 0.10=\$ 3.90$, and the other subject would receive $31 \times 2=62$ points, that is $62 \times \$ 0.10=\$ 6.20$.

## Example 2:

Divide 40 tokens: Hold $\qquad$ 3 point each, and Pass @ 1 points each.
In this example every token you hold earns you 3 points, and every token you pass ear ns the other subject 1 point. Again, each point you earn is worth $\$ 0.10$ to you, and each point the other subject earns is worth $\$ 0.10$ to the other subject.

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Dictator Games - Decision Maker Screens (Named Partner - anon/non-anon. comparison on two screens)

## House Experiment - Game Phase

## Earning Money

## The instructions differ slightly from last time. Please read carefully.

Last December, about 300 students in your house participated in our study. Half of these students are now invited to play the role of player 1 and to make decisions about allocating tokens, just as you do. The other half of these students play the role of player $\mathbf{2}$ and receive tokens.

In the following we explain step by step how your earnings today are determined.

```
Goto Step 1
```

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## Earning Money

## The instructions differ slightly from last time. Please read carefully.

Last December, about 300 students in your house participated in our study. Half of these students are now invited to play the role of player 1 and to make decisions about allocating tokens, just as you do. The other half of these students play the role of player $\mathbf{2}$ and receive tokens.

In the following we explain step by step how your earnings today are determined.

```
1.,YOU play with FI VE
    players.
```


## 2. At most ONE decision is randomly selected.

- Today we match you with FI VE other players in your house.
- For each player we ask you to make a number of decisions.
- After you have made your decisions for all players, a computer program will randomly exactly one of the decisions that you are making today or that you made last week for payment.
- The program ensures that each player 1 is matched with one and only one player 2 during the course of this experiment.
- Your earnings from this experiment will be added to your Crimson Cash.
- Alternatively, we are happy to send a check to you: if you are a senior this will be the default option. At the end of the second part of this experiment we will ask for a mailing address in case you want a check with your earnings mailed to you. Please email Professor Mobius directly if you do not receive a check within the first week of J une.


## We will pay you in a timely manner!

- To protect your privacy your earnings will be compiled by a computer program using your Harvard ID number as a reference, and your earnings will be transmitted electronically to the Crimson Card office to be fed into a database.
- None of the experimenters or their research assistant will ever see the earnings of any particular student.

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Dictator Games - Decision Maker Screens (Named Partner - anon/non-anon. comparison on two screens)
House Experiment - Game Phase
Make your DECISI ONS

## On the following two pages we ask you to make decisions of how to allocate tokens between yourself and five other players from Lowell

 house.- First we ask you to allocate tokens for those five players in a situation where the other player WILL NOT FIND OUT your identity and the selected decision when he or she receives earnings. We will also NOT inform you about the selected decision and about the identity of player 2 when we pay your earnings.
- On the second page you will be asked to allocate tokens again for the same players but now in a situation where the other player WILL FIND OUT your identity and the selected decision when he or she receives earnings. We will also inform you about the selected decision and about the identity of player 2 when we pay your earnings.
 have made for allocating tokens between yourself and that player will be implemented.

Example:The computer might pick your match with JANE SMITH from Lowell house in a situation where JANE does NOT KNOW that you allocate tokens for her. Amongst the three decisions you made for JANE the computer might use the decision where you alloc ated tokens which are worth 3 points to you and 1 point to JANE. Assume you decided to hold 10 tokens and pass 40 tokens to JANE. Then you will receive $10 \times 3 \times \$ 0.10=\$ 3.00$ and JANE will receive $40 \times \$ 0.10=\$ 4.00$. In this situation neither JANE nor you will be informed by us that this decision was selected for calculating your earnings.

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Dictator Games - Decision Maker Screens (Named Partner - anon/non-anon. comparison on two screens)

## House Experiment - Game Phase

## Make Your Decisions When Other Player WI LL NOT FI ND OUT your identity when paid his or her winnings.

Please fill in the blanks below. Remember, all points are worth $\$ 0.10$ to all subjects. Also remember that if the match with this player is implemented one of your three decisions in one of the two situations will be selected.

[^0]Dictator Games - Decision Maker Screens (Named Partner - anon/non-anon. comparison on two screens)

## House Experiment - Game Phase

## Make Your Decisions When Other Player WI LL NOT FI ND OUT your identity when paid his or her winnings.

Please fill in the blanks below. Remember, all points are worth $\mathbf{\$ 0 . 1 0}$ to all subjects. Also remember that if the match with this player is implemented one of your three decisions in one of the two situations will be selected.
YOU divide 50 tokens between yourself and TANYA THEODORE.
TANYA WI LL NOT FIND OUT that you allocated tokens for her when she receives her earnings and observes the
number of points she received from the match with you. We will also NOT inform you which of your decisions
determined your earnings nor that a decision for TANYA was selected for payment.

# Dictator Games - Decision Maker Screens (Named Partner - anon/non-anon. comparison on two screens) <br> House Experiment - Game Phase 

## Make Your Decisions When Other Player WILL NOT FIND OUT your identity when paid his or her winnings.



## YOU divide 50 tokens between yourself and TANYA THEODORE.

 you which of your decisions determined your earnings nor that a decision for TANYA was selected for payment.

| Decision 1: Divide 50 tokens: Hold [50 | - @ 3 points each, and Pass ${ }^{\circ}$ | - @ 1 point each |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Decision 2; Divide 50 tokens: Hold | - @ 2 points each, and Pass ${ }^{\circ}$ | - @ 2 points |
| Decision 3; Divide 50 tokens: Hold ${ }^{25}$ | - @ 1 point each, and Pass ${ }^{25}$ | @ |



Decision 1; Divide 50 tokens: Hold $\left[50\right.$ - @ 3 points each, and Pass $\Gamma_{0}$ point each
Decision 2: Divide 50 tokens: Hold $\sqrt{50}$ - 2 points each, and Pass ${ }^{\circ} 2$ points each
Decision 3: Divide 50 tokens: Hold $\sqrt{50}$ @ 1 point each, and Pass $\sqrt{0} 3$ points each


## YOU divide 50 tokens between yourself and HUI + EN YANG.

 you which of your decisions determined your earnings nor that a decision for HUI + EN was selected for payment.


## YOU divide 50 tokens between yourself and DAMON KUHN.

 which of your decisions determined your earnings nor that a decision for DAMON was selected for payment


Dictator Games - Decision Maker Screens (Named Partner - anon/non-anon. comparison on two screens)
House Experiment - Game Phase

## Make Your Decisions When Other Player WI LL FIND OUT your identity when paid his or her winnings.



|  | YOU divide 50 tokens between yourself an |
| :---: | :---: |
| DAMON WILL FIND OUT that you allocated tokens for him when he receives his earnings and observes the number of points he received from the match with you. We will also inform you which of your decisions determined your earnings nor that a decision for DAMON was selected for payment. |  |
| Decision 1: Divide 50 tokens: Hold | $\checkmark$ @ 3 points each, and Pass ${ }^{\text {- }}$ - 1 point each |
| Decision 2; Divide 50 tokens: Hold | - @ 2 points each, and Pass ${ }_{25}$ - 2 points each |
| Decision 3: Divide 50 tokens: Hold $/ 0$ | $\checkmark$ @ 1 point each, and Pass $\sqrt{50}$ - @ 3 points each |



Decision 1:Divide 50 tokens: Hold $\sqrt{50}$ - @ 3 points each, and Pass ${ }_{0}$ - 1 point each
Decision 2: Divide 50 tokens: Hold $\sqrt{25}$ @ 2 points each, and Pass $\sqrt{25} 2$ points each
Decision 3; Divide 50 tokens: Hold ${ }_{25}$ @ 1 point each, and Pass ${ }_{25}$ points each


## YOU divide 50 tokens between yourself and HUI +EN YANG.

 which of your decisions determined your earnings nor that a decision for HUI +EN was selected for payment.

| D | - @ 3 points each, and Pass ${ }^{\circ}$ | - @ 1 point each |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Decision 2: Divide 50 tokens: Hold ${ }^{25}$ | - @ 2 points each, and Pass $\sqrt{25}$ | - @ 2 points each |
|  | - @ 1 | @ 3 points each |

## YOU divide 50 tokens between yourself and TANYA THEODORE.

 which of your decisions determined your earnings nor that a decision for TANYA was selected for payment.


Dictator Games - Decision Maker Screens (Named Partner - anon/non-anon. comparison on two screens)
House Experiment - Game Phase

## Payment Details

We will now ask you how you want to receive your earnings. You have a choice between Crimson Cash or PayPal or a check sent by U.S. postal mail service.
We will make every effort to transfer your payments within the first week of J une 2004.
NOTE: We will send you a separate email informing you about your earnings, whom you played with (if applicable) and how many tokens were passed.

Which basic payment method do you prefer?

- Crimson Cash
- Paypal
- check sent through U.S. postal mail service

Dictator Games - Partner Screens (Named Decision Maker - anon/non-anon. comparison on same screen)

## House Experiment - Game Phase

## Instructions - Page 1

This is the second and final stage of an ongoing experiment about decision-making (the first stage took place last December). Once you complete this stage you will be eligible to win valuable prizes in our large raffle, including a trip to Europe (one per house), dinners for two, movie tickets for two etc. The probability of winning is higher than one in three and your expected earnings are at least $\$ 8$. On top of this you can earn up to $\$ 30$ from the decisions you make. A research foundation has provided the funds for this experiment.
This experiment should take about 10-15 minutes of your time (including reading the instructions).

> | We will record your data only under an anonymous numeric identifier and we will keep your |
| :--- |
| data confidential. In order to keep your decisions private, please do not reveal your choices |
| to any other participant. |

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## House Experiment - Game Phase

## Instructions - Page 2

## You are PLAYER 2

in a two-player game. PLAYER 1 is another randomly chosen student in your house who is asked to make a series of choices about how to divide a set of tokens between himself and you. As player 1 divides the tokens, both player 1 and you will each earn points. Every point that subjects earn will be worth 10 cents. For example, if you earn 58 points you will make $\$ 5.80$ in the experiment.
Player 1 faces the following three decisions.
Divide 50 tokens: Hold __ @ 1 point each, and Pass __- @ 3 points each.
Divide 50 tokens: Hold __ @ 2 point each, and Pass _-_ @ 2 points each.
Divide 50 tokens: Hold __ @ 3 point each, and Pass __- @ 1 points each.

In all three choices player 1 must divide 50 tokens. He can keep all the tokens, keep some and pass some, or pass all the tokens. For example, in his first choice player 1 will receive 1 point for every token he holds, and you as player 2 will receive 3 points for every token player 1 passes.

Example 1 (cont.): If player 1 holds 50 and passes 0 tokens in his first choice, he will receive 50 points, or $50 \times \$ 0.10=\$ 5.00$, and you will receive no points and $\$ 0$. If player 1 holds 0 tokens and passes 50 , he will receive $\$ 0$ and you will receive $50 \times 3=150$ po ints, or $150 \times \$ 0.10=\$ 15.00$. However, player 1 could choose any number between 0 and 50 to hold. For instance, he could choose to hold 39 tokens and pass 11. In this case he would earn 39 points, or $39 \mathrm{x} \$ 0.10=\$ 3.90$, and you would receive $11 \mathrm{x} 2=22$ points, that is 22 x $\$ 0.10=\$ 2.20$.

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Dictator Games - Partner Screens (Named Decision Maker - anon/non-anon. comparison on same screen)

## House Experiment - Game Phase

## Earning Money

Last December, about 300 students in your house participated in our study. Half of these students are now invited to play the role of player 1 and to make decisions about allocating tokens. The other half of these students play the role of player 2 and receive tokens. No student plays both roles.

YOU are a PLAYER 2 in this experiment.
In the following we explain step by step how your earnings are determined.

```
Goto Step }
```


## Dictator Games - Partner Screens (Named Decision Maker - anon/non-anon. comparison on same screen)

House Experiment - Game Phase

## Earning Money

 and player 2 and receive tokens. No student plays both roles.

YOU are a PLAYER 2 in this experiment.
In the following we explain step by step how your earnings are determined.

1. ONE match with a player 1 selected for payment.
2. ONE decision is randomly selected.
3. YOUR task is to PREDICT
how other players
allocate tokens.

- Each student in your house in the role of player 1 is matched with seven player 2's from your house and takes several decisions for each player 2.
- A computer program will randomly select out of all the matches and all the decisions exactly one decision for payment.
- The program ensures that each player 1 in this experiment is matched with exactly one player 2. Therefore, you will be matched with exactly one player 1 whose decision will affects your earnings. This will constitute the first part of your earnings.
- You can increase your earnings further by up to $\$ 15$ by making good predictions about the actions of specific students who play the role of player 1 in this experiment.
- We will present you with several player 1/player 2 pairs. Some pairs might involve some other player and yourself such as:
"J oe Smith allocates 50 tokens between himself and YOU. One token is worth $\mathbf{1}$ to him and 3 to you. How many tokens will Joe Smith pass to YOU?"
Other pairs might not involve you at all such as:
"J oe Smith allocates 50 tokens between himself and Jane Connor. One token is worth $\mathbf{1}$ to him and 3 to you. How many tokens will J oe Smith pass to Jane Connor?"
- For each pair of players you can make any prediction between $\mathbf{0}$ and 50 passed tokens.
- Out of all your predictions the computer will randomly select one prediction and compare it to player 1's actual decision. Note, that in most cases this decision will not be the one that determines the first part of your earnings.

4. YOU can INCREASE YOUR EARNINGS by making good predictions.

- If you predict precisely the right number of tokens for the selected match you will receive $\$ 15$.
- For each mispredicted token we will subtract $\$ 0.30$ from your earnings. For example, if you predict that player 1 passes 10 tokens and he actually passes 15 tokens then you will receive $\$ 15-5 \times \mathbf{0 . 3 0 = \$ 1 3 . 5 0}$. If you predict that player 1 passes 10 tokens and he actually passes 5 tokens then you will receive \$15-5 x $\$ 0.30=\$ 13.50$. The closer your estimate is to the actual number of tokens passed the higher are your earnings.

Example: If you think that the allocator is equally likely to pass any number of tokens between 40 and 50 then you will maximize your ag@itho@fıarnings by predicting the number 45.

Dictator Games - Partner Screens (Named Decision Maker - anon/non-anon. comparison on same screen)

- We will not tell you which player 1/ player 2 pair was used to determine this second part of your earnings.

5. Today's earnings are added to Crimson Cash OR you can request a check.

- Both the first and second part of today's earnings will be added to your Crimson Cash account after you have completed both parts of the experiment.
- Alternatively, we are happy to send a check to you: if you are a senior this will be the default option. At the end of this experiment we will ask for a mailing address in case you want a check with your earnings mailed to you. Please email Professor Mobius directly if you do not receive a check within the first week of June.


## We will pay you in a timely manner!

- To protect your privacy your earnings will be compiled by a computer program using your Harvard ID number as a reference, and your earnings will be transmitted electronically to the Crimson Card office to be fed into a database.
- None of the experimenters or their research assistants will ever see the earnings of any particular student.

Dictator Games - Partner Screens (Named Decision Maker - anon/non-anon. comparison on same screen)

## House Experiment - Game Phase

## Make your PREDICTI ONS - Pair 1 out of 7

On each of the following seven pages we present you with a different player from Kirkland house who makes THREE decisions for allocating tokens between himself/ herself and some player 2 . We ask you to predict how each player 1 allocates token between himself and herself in two situations:

- In both situations player 1 KNOWS the identity of player 2.
- In the first situation player 2 KNOWS
the identity of player 1. Player 2 will be informed about player 1's identity and the number of points they have received from this match when when they are paid their earnings. We will also inform player 1 about the selected decision and about the identity of player 2 when we pay earnings.
- In the second situation player 2 DOES NOT KNOW
the identity of player 1 . We will also NOT inform player 1 about the selected decision and about the identity of player 2 when we pay earnings.
 player1/ player2 pairs on this and the next few pages we will select ONE decision of some player 1 and compare it to your prediction. You will earn $\$ 15$ if you get the number of tokens passed by the player 1 exactly right. We will subtract $\$ 0.30$ for each token you get wrong.

[^1]| $\ll$ Previous Page | Next Page >> |
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2 3

Dictator Games - Partner Screens (Named Decision Maker - anon/non-anon. comparison on same screen)

## House Experiment - Game Phase

## Make your PREDICTI ONS - Pair 1 out of 7

## On each of the following seven pages we present you with a different player from Kirkland house who makes THREE decisions for allocating tokens between himself/ herself and some player $\mathbf{2}$. We ask you to predict how each player 1 allocates token between himself and herself in

 two situations:- In both situations player 1 KNOWS the identity of player 2.
- In the first situation player 2 KNOWS
the identity of player 1. Player 2 will be informed about player 1's identity and the number of points they have received from this match when when they are paid their earnings.
We will also inform player 1 about the selected decision and about the identity of player 2 when we pay earnings.
- In the second situation player 2 DOES NOT KNOW
the identity of player 1 . We will also NOT inform player 1 about the selected decision and about the identity of player 2 when we pay earnings.

Player 1 is either matched to you or some other player in your house. We ask you to predict how many tokens player 1 will pass in each decision. Of all the player1/ player2 pairs on this and the next few pages we will select ONE decision of some player 1 and compare it to your prediction. You will earn $\$ 15$ if you get the number of tokens passed by the player 1 exactly right. We will subtract $\$ 0.30$ for each token you get wrong.

TONI + MARI E MARMAROS divides 50 tokens between HERSELF and YOU.

| First Situation: | - TONI + MARIE KNOWS that she is playing a game with YOU. <br> - YOU WILL KNOW that TONI + MARI E allocated tokens for you when you receive your earnings. We will also inform TONI + MARIE which of his/ her decisions determined his/ her earnings and that a decision for YOU was selected for payment. |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | One token is worth ... | YOU | hat TONI + MARIE |
| Decision 1: | ... 1 point to TONI + MARI E and 3 points to YOU. | 25 | $\checkmark$ tokens to YOU. |
| Decision 2: | ... 2 points to TONI + MARI E and 2 points to YOU. | 20 | $\checkmark$ tokens to YOU. |
| Decision 3: | ... 3 points to TONI + MARIE and 1 point to YOU. |  | $\checkmark$ tokens to YoU. |

[^2]| $\ll$ Previous Page | Next Page >> | $\mathbf{1}$ | $\mathbf{2}$ | $\mathbf{3}$ | 4 |
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Dictator Games - Partner Screens (Named Decision Maker - anon/non-anon. comparison on same screen)

## House Experiment - Game Phase

## Make your PREDI CTI ONS - Pair 1 out of 7

On each of the following seven pages we present you with a different player from Kirkland house who makes THREE decisions for allocating tokens between himself/ herself and some player $\mathbf{2}$. We ask you to predict how each player 1 allocates token between himself and herself in two situations:

- In both situations player 1 KNOWS the identity of player 2.
- In the first situation player 2 KNOWS
the identity of player 1. Player 2 will be informed about player 1's identity and the number of points they have received from this match when when they are paid their earnings.
We will also inform player 1 about the selected decision and about the identity of player 2 when we pay earnings.
- In the second situation player 2 DOES NOT KNOW
the identity of player 1 . We will also NOT inform player 1 about the selected decision and about the identity of player 2 when we pay earnings.

Player 1 is either matched to you or some other player in your house. We ask you to predict how many tokens player 1 will pass in each decision. Of all the player1/ player2 pairs on this and the next few pages we will select ONE decision of some player 1 and compare it to your prediction. You will earn $\$ 15$ if you get the number of tokens passed by the player 1 exactly right. We will subtract $\$ 0.30$ for each token you get wrong.

TONI + MARIE MARMAROS divides 50 tokens between HERSELF and YOU.



Dictator Games - Partner Screens (Named Decision Maker - anon/non-anon. comparison on same screen)
House Experiment - Game Phase

## Make your PREDI CTI ONS - Pair 2 out of 7

## We now ask you to repeat the same exercise for the second player $\mathbf{1} /$ player 2 pair.

Player 1 is either matched to you or some other player in your house. We ask you to predict how many tokens player 1 will pass in each decision. Of all the player1/ player2 pairs on this and the next few pages we will select ONE decision of some player 1 and compare it to your prediction. You will earn $\$ 15$ if you get the number of tokens passed by the player 1 exactly right. We will subtract $\$ 0.30$ for each token you get wrong.

ERIN SKINNER divides 50 tokens between HERSELF and YOU.



## House Experiment - Game Phase

## Instructions - Page 1

This is the second and final stage of an ongoing experiment about decision-making (the first stage took place last December). Once you complete this stage you will be eligible to win valuable prizes in our large raffle, including a trip to Europe (one per house), dinners for two, movie tickets for two etc. The probability of winning is higher than one in three and your expected earnings are at least $\$ 8$. On top of this you can earn up to $\$ 30$ from the decisions you make. A research foundation has provided the funds for this experiment.
This experiment should take about 10-15 minutes of your time (including reading the instructions).

> | We will record your data only under an anonymous numeric identifier and we will keep your |
| :--- |
| data confidential. In order to keep your decisions private, please do not reveal your choices |
| to any other participant. |

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## House Experiment - Game Phase

## Instructions - Page 2

## You are PLAYER 2

in a two-player game. PLAYER 1 is another randomly chosen student in your house who is asked to make a series of choices about how to divide a set of tokens between himself and you. As player 1 divides the tokens, both player 1 and you will each earn points. Every point that subjects earn will be worth 10 cents. For example, if you earn 58 points you will make $\$ 5.80$ in the experiment.
Player 1 faces the following three decisions.
Divide 50 tokens: Hold __ @ 1 point each, and Pass __- @ 3 points each.
Divide 50 tokens: Hold __ @ 2 point each, and Pass _-_ @ 2 points each.
Divide 50 tokens: Hold __ @ 3 point each, and Pass __- @ 1 points each.

In all three choices player 1 must divide 50 tokens. He can keep all the tokens, keep some and pass some, or pass all the tokens. For example, in his first choice player 1 will receive 1 point for every token he holds, and you as player 2 will receive 3 points for every token player 1 passes.

Example 1 (cont.): If player 1 holds 50 and passes 0 tokens in his first choice, he will receive 50 points, or $50 \times \$ 0.10=\$ 5.00$, and you will receive no points and $\$ 0$. If player 1 holds 0 tokens and passes 50 , he will receive $\$ 0$ and you will receive $50 \times 3=150$ points, or $150 \times \$ 0.10=\$ 15.00$. However, player 1 could choose any number between 0 and 50 to hold. For instance, he could choose to hold 39 tokens and pass 11. In this case he would earn 39 points, or $39 \mathrm{x} \$ 0.10=\$ 3.90$, and you would receive $11 \mathrm{x} 2=22$ points, that is 22 x $\$ 0.10=\$ 2.20$.

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Dictator Games - Partner Screens (Named Decision Maker - anon/non-anon. comparison on two screens)

## House Experiment - Game Phase

## Earning Money

Last December, about 300 students in your house participated in our study. Half of these students are now invited to play the role of player 1 and to make decisions about allocating tokens. The other half of these students play the role of player 2 and receive tokens. No student plays both roles.

YOU are a PLAYER 2 in this experiment.
In the following we explain step by step how your earnings are determined.

```
Goto Step }
```


## Dictator Games - Partner Screens (Named Decision Maker - anon/non-anon. comparison on two screens)

House Experiment - Game Phase

## Earning Money

 de player 2 and receive tokens. No student plays both roles.

YOU are a PLAYER 2 in this experiment.
In the following we explain step by step how your earnings are determined.

1. ONE match with a player 1 selected for payment.
2. ONE decision is randomly selected.

## 3. YoUR task is to PREDICT

how other players
allocate tokens.

- Each student in your house in the role of player 1 is matched with seven player 2's from your house and takes several decisions for each player 2.
- A computer program will randomly select out of all the matches and all the decisions exactly one decision for payment.
- The program ensures that each player 1 in this experiment is matched with exactly one player 2. Therefore, you will be matched with exactly one player 1 whose decision will affects your earnings. This will constitute the first part of your earnings.
- You can increase your earnings further by up to $\$ 15$ by making good predictions about the actions of specific students who play the role of player 1 in this experiment.
- We will present you with several player 1/ player 2 pairs. Some pairs might involve some other player and yourself such as:
"J oe Smith allocates 50 tokens between himself and YOU. One token is worth 1 to him and 3 to you. How many tokens will Joe Smith pass to YOU?"
Other pairs might not involve you at all such as:
"J oe Smith allocates 50 tokens between himself and Jane Connor. One token is worth $\mathbf{1}$ to him and 3 to you. How many tokens will J oe Smith pass to J ane Connor?"
- For each pair of players you can make any prediction between $\mathbf{0}$ and 50 passed tokens.
- Out of all your predictions the computer will randomly select one prediction and compare it to player 1's actual decision. Note, that in most cases this decision will not be the one that determines the first part of your earnings.

4. YOU can INCREASE YOUR EARNINGS by making good predictions.

- If you predict precisely the right number of tokens for the selected match you will receive $\$ 15$.
- For each mispredicted token we will subtract $\$ 0.30$ from your earnings. For example, if you predict that player 1 passes 10 tokens and he actually passes 15 tokens then you will receive $\$ 15-5 \times \$ 0.30=\$ 13.50$. If you predict that player 1 passes 10 tokens and he actually passes 5 tokens then you will receive $\$ 15-5 \times$ $\$ 0.30=\$ 13.50$. The closer your estimate is to the actual number of tokens passed the higher are your earnings.

Example: If you think that the allocator is equally likely to pass any number of tokens between 40 and 50 then you will maximize yobiagterifionfalldarnings by predicting the number 45.

Dictator Games - Partner Screens (Named Decision Maker - anon/non-anon. comparison on two screens)

- We will not tell you which player 1/ player 2 pair was used to determine this second part of your earnings.

5. Today's earnings are added to Crimson Cash OR you can request a check.

- Both the first and second part of today's earnings will be added to your Crimson Cash account after you have completed both parts of the experiment.
- Alternatively, we are happy to send a check to you: if you are a senior this will be the default option. At the end of this experiment we will ask for a mailing address in case you want a check with your earnings mailed to you. Please email Professor Mobius directly if you do not receive a check within the first week of June.


## We will pay you in a timely manner!

- To protect your privacy your earnings will be compiled by a computer program using your Harvard ID number as a reference, and your earnings will be transmitted electronically to the Crimson Card office to be fed into a database.
- None of the experimenters or their research assistants will ever see the earnings of any particular student.

Dictator Games - Partner Screens (Named Decision Maker - anon/non-anon. comparison on two screens)
House Experiment - Game Phase

## Make your PREDICTI ONS

On this page and the next we present you with seven player 1's from Kirkland house who each make THREE decisions for allocating tokens.
you get the number of tokens passed by the player 1 exactly right. We will subtract $\$ 0.30$ for each token you get wrong.

Start making predictions

Dictator Games - Partner Screens (Named Decision Maker - anon/non-anon. comparison on two screens)
House Experiment - Game Phase
Make your PREDICTI ONS
On this page and the next we present you with seven player 1's from Kirkland house who each make THREE decisions for allocating tokens.
you get the number of tokens passed by the player 1 exactly right. We will subtract $\$ 0.30$ for each token you get wrong.

For all player 1/ player 2 matches on this page:

- Player 1 KNOWS the identity of player 2.
- Player 2 WILL NOT FIND OUT the identity of player 1 when receiving earnings. We will also NOT inform player 1 about the selected decision and about the identity of player 2 when we pay earnings.

Goto first pair and make your 1st out of 7 predictions

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Dictator Games - Partner Screens (Named Decision Maker - anon/non-anon. comparison on two screens)
House Experiment - Game Phase
Make your PREDICTI ONS
On this page and the next we present you with seven player 1 's from Kirkland house who each make THREE decisions for allocating tokens.
you get the number of tokens passed by the player 1 exactly right. We will subtract $\$ 0.30$ for each token you get wrong.

For all player 1/ player 2 matches on this page:

- Player 1 KNOWS the identity of player 2.
- Player 2 WILL NOT FIND OUT the identity of player 1 when receiving earnings. We will also NOT inform player 1 about the selected decision and about the identity of player 2 when we pay earnings.

| AMY DUFLO divides 50 tokens between HERSELF and YOU. |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | One token is worth ... |  |  | AMY will PASS |
| Decision 1: | ... 1 point to AMY and 3 points to YOU. | 21 | $\checkmark$ | tokens to YOU. |
| Decision 2: | ... 2 points to AMY and 2 points to YOU. | 13 | $\checkmark$ | tokens to YOU. |
| Decision 3: | ... 3 points to AMY and 1 point to YOU. | 0 | $\checkmark$ | tokens to YOU. |

- AMY knows that she is playing a game with YOU.

Remember: - YOU WILL NOT KNOW that AMY allocated tokens for you when you receive your earnings.

- We will also NOT inform AMY about the selected decision and about the identity of YOU when we pay earnings.


## Goto next pair and make your 2nd out of 7 predictions

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Dictator Games - Partner Screens (Named Decision Maker - anon/non-anon. comparison on two screens)

## House Experiment - Game Phase

## Make your PREDI CTI ONS - Page 2

This is the second and LAST page of the experiment. We present with another set of seven player 1 's from Kirkland house who allocate tokens.

The difference to the previous page is that now player 2 WILL FI ND OUT about the identity of player 1 when he or she receives his or her earnings. We will also inform player 1 about the selected decision and about the identity of player 2 when we pay earnings.

> Player 1 is either matched to you or some other player in your house. We ask you to predict how many tokens player 1 will pass in each decision. Of all the
> player1/ player2 pairs on this and the next few pages we will select ONE decision of some player 1 and compare it to your prediction. You will earn $\$ 15$ if you get the number of tokens passed by the player 1 exactly right. We will subtract $\$ 0.30$ for each token you get wrong.

Start making predictions

Dictator Games - Partner Screens (Named Decision Maker - anon/non-anon. comparison on two screens)
House Experiment - Game Phase

## Make your PREDI CTI ONS - Page 2

This is the second and LAST page of the experiment. We present with another set of seven player 1's from Kirkland house who allocate tokens.

The difference to the previous page is that now player 2 WILL FI ND OUT about the identity of player 1 when he or she receives his or her earnings. We will also inform player 1 about the selected decision and about the identity of player 2 when we pay earnings.
you get the number of tokens passed by the player 1 exactly right. We will subtract $\$ 0.30$ for each token you get wrong.

For all player 1 / player 2 matches on this page:

- Player 1 KNOWS the identity of player 2.
- Player 2 WILL FIND OUT the identity of player 1 when receiving earnings. We will also inform player 1 about the selected decision and about the identity of player 2 when we pay earnings.

Goto first pair and make your 1st out of 7 predictions

Dictator Games - Partner Screens (Named Decision Maker - anon/non-anon. comparison on two screens)

## House Experiment - Game Phase

## Make your PREDI CTI ONS - Page 2

This is the second and LAST page of the experiment. We present with another set of seven player 1 's from Kirkland house who allocate tokens.

The difference to the previous page is that now player 2 WILL FI ND OUT about the identity of player 1 when he or she receives his or her earnings. We will also inform player 1 about the selected decision and about the identity of player 2 when we pay earnings.
you get the number of tokens passed by the player 1 exactly right. We will subtract $\$ 0.30$ for each token you get wrong.

## For all player 1 / player 2 matches on this page:

- Player 1 KNOWS the identity of player 2.
- Player 2 WILL FIND OUT the identity of player 1 when receiving earnings. We will also inform player 1 about the selected decision and about the identity of player 2 when we pay earnings.

| I SAAC WI SEMAN divides 50 tokens between HI MSELF and YOU. |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | One token is worth ... |  |  | ISAAC will P |
| Decision 1: | ... 1 point to ISAAC and 3 points to YOU. | 46 | - | tokens to YOU. |
| Decision 2: | ... 2 points to ISAAC and 2 points to YOU. | 21 | $\checkmark$ | tokens to YOU. |
| Decision 3: | ... 3 points to ISAAC and 1 point to YOU. | 8 | $\checkmark$ | tokens to YOU. |

- ISAAC knows that he is playing a game with YOU.

Remember: - YOU WILL KNOW that ISAAC allocated tokens for you when you receive your earnings.

- We will also inform ISAAC about the selected decision and about the identity of YOU when we pay earnings.

[^3]

## Helping Game

The following instructions are included:

- Decision Maker Screens - Nameless Partner
- Decision Maker Screens - Named Partner - Anonymous Treatment
- Decision Maker Screens - Named Partner - Non-Anonymous Treatment

Decision makers made decisions for nameless and named partners one week apart.

Partners were presented in random order to decision makers.

## Facebook 2006 Game

## Informed Consent Form

Please check the checkbox at the end of this page if you agree with the contents of the consent form (below on yellow background). This will indicate that you formally consent to participate in our study.

You participated in the trivia game which was conducted during the 2004/2005 academic year. You might also have participated in some or all parts of the Facebook Experiment. We are conducting a new experiment this year which we call the Facebook 2006 Experiment. It will consist of three short parts and each part takes about 5 minutes to complete. You can leave the game at any time. You can earn on average up to $\$ \mathbf{2 0}$ by participating in the study.

The purpose of the Facebook 2006 Experiment is to study economic decision making in social networks.
Your participation is important for the success of the research project and is very much appreciated! Please address any questions to Prof. Markus Mobius, Associate Professor at the department of economics at Harvard.

There is a Standing Committee on the Use of Human Subjects in Research at Harvard University to which complaints or problems
$\ulcorner$ Please check this box if you agree with the terms and conditions of the study.

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## Facebook 2006 Game

## Instructions

Welcome back to the Facebook 2006 Experiment! The experiment will consist of three parts. This is part 1. You will receive an email in about a week providing you with a link to participate in parts 2 and 3 . Each part will take about 5 minutes to complete. You must complete all parts of the experiment to receive your earnings. All payments will be made after the conclusion of Part 3 of the experiment.

In all parts you will make a number of decisions in a sequence of "situations". Please read the instructions carefully for each situation, as each situation is different.

At the end of the experiment one situation from either Part 1, 2 or 3 will be randomly selected and you will be paid accordingly. Note that in Part 1 you can be only paid for at most one decision, but each decision has a chance of being selected.

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Helping Game - Decision Maker Screens (Nameless Partner)

## Facebook 2006 Game

## Instructions

In today's part 1 all decisions are anonymous - neither player 1 nor player 2 in any game will find out who he or she was paired with.

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## Facebook 2006 Game

## Situation 1- Transfer Game

In this situation you will be randomly and anonymously matched with another student at Harvard who is participating in this experiment. You have been given $\mathbf{\$ 4 5}$ and the other player has $\mathbf{\$ 0}$. You can increase the other player's earnings by $\mathbf{\$ 3 0}$ if you pay some price $\$ \mathbf{P}$.
$\$ P$ will be randomly drawn between 0 and 30 . You have to decide whether you are willing to pay $\$ P$ for the other player to receive $\$ 30$. We ask you what is the highest price $\$ P$ which you are willing to pay.

I am willing to pay up to $\$ 20$ for the other player to receive $\$ 30$.

If the computer selects a price $\$ P$ less or equal than $\mathbf{\$ 2 0}$ then your earnings are $\mathbf{\$ 4 5 - \$ \mathbf { P }}$ and the other player receives $\mathbf{\$ 0 + \$ 3 0}$. If the computer selects a price $\$ P$ greater than $\mathbf{\$ 2 0}$ then your earnings are $\mathbf{\$ 4 5}$ and the other player receives $\mathbf{\$ 0}$.

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## Facebook 2006 Game

## Situation 2- Token Game

In this situation you will be randomly and anonymously matched with another student at Harvard who is participating in this experiment. You must decide how to divide $\mathbf{1 0 0}$ tokens between yourself and the other person. Each token is worth $\mathbf{\$ 0 . 1 5}$ to you, and worth $\mathbf{\$ 0 . 3 0}$ to the other person.

Please remember that if the computer randomly selects you to play the transfer game situation on the previous screen you will not play this situation and vice versa. You and the other player will only be paid for one of the decisions you make in part 1, 2 and 3 of this experiment.

How many tokens do you want to pass to the other player?
I want to pass $\sqrt{10}$ tokens to the other player, and keep 90 tokens for myself.

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## Facebook 2006 Game

## Payment Options

You can get paid through Crimson Cash, Paypal or by check. In the latter two cases please provide your Paypal email or a physical address to which we can send a check between May 26 and June 14. After the last part of the experiment you have one more chance to revise your payment options.
o Crimson Cash

- Paypal
- Check

Helping Game - Decision Maker Screens (Nameless Partner)

## Facebook 2006 Game

Thank you! We will contact you by email for part 2 in a couple of days.

## Facebook 2006 Game - Part 2

## Instructions

Welcome back to the Facebook 2006 Experiment! This is the second part of this three-part experiment. You must complete all parts of the experiment to receive your earnings.

As before, you are presented today with a sequence of "situations". Please read the instructions carefully. Notice that each situation is different.

Please remember that you can only be paid for at most one situation from the following sequence, but that each situation has a chance of being implemented.

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## Facebook 2006 Game - Part 2

## Instructions

In each of the following four situations you will be matched with one specific student at Harvard to play the transfer game which you might remember from the first part.

We will always tell you the name of the other student. If that situation is randomly selected for payment neither you nor the other student will be informed that this situation has been selected, nor will the other player be informed about your decision. Both you and the other student will be paid according to the decisions you made in that situation.

In each situation you will be given $\$ 45$ and the other student will be given $\$ 0$. We will then ask for the highest price, $\$ P$, that you would be willing to pay in order to increase the other student's earnings by $\$ 30$. We will randomly select a price $\$ P$ between $\$ 0$ and $\$ 30$, and if this price $\$ P$ is smaller than or equal to the maximum price you are willing to pay then we will subtract $\$ P$ from your earnings and add $\$ 30$ to the earnings of the student that you are paired with. Otherwise, your earnings will be $\$ 45$ and that student's earnings will be $\$ 0$.

There is a small probability that the student that you are matched with will be offered an opportunity to either (a) select to receive a payoff which ranges anywhere between $\$ 0$ and $\$ 30$ instead of playing the transfer game with you or (b) choose to play the transfer game with somebody else instead of playing the transfer game with you. One of these possibilities will be available to the other student with probability $20 \%$ or 1 out of 5 . If the student decides to get a payoff or play with another player, you will keep your $\$ 45$, regardless of the price $\$ P$ that you choose on the following screens. Since in most cases, the other student cannot make a selection or a choice, your choice of $\$ \mathrm{P}$ will in most cases determine both your and the other student's earnings.

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Helping Game - Decision Maker Screens (Named Partner - anonymous treatment)

## Facebook 2006 Game - Part 2

## Situation 1 - Transfer Game with Tanya Rosenblat

Remember that if this situation is selected for payment neither you nor Tanya Rosenblat will be informed that this situation has been selected, nor will Tanya Rosenblat be informed about your decision. Both you and Tanya Rosenblat will be paid according to the decisions you made in this situation.

You have been given $\mathbf{\$ 4 5}$ and Tanya Rosenblat has been given $\mathbf{\$ 0}$. What is the highest price, $\mathbf{\$ P}$, that you are willing to pay in order to increase Tanya Rosenblat's earnings by $\mathbf{\$ 3 0}$ ?

I am willing to pay up to $\$ 10$

- in order to increase Tanya Rosenblat's earnings by $\mathbf{\$ 3 0}$.

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Helping Game - Decision Maker Screens (Named Partner - anonymous treatment)

## Facebook 2006 Game - Part 2

## Situation 2 - Transfer Game with Arnold Zwinger

Remember that if this situation is selected for payment neither you nor Arnold Zwinger will be informed that this situation has been selected, nor will Arnold Zwinger be informed about your decision. Both you and Arnold Zwinger will be paid according to the decisions you made in this situation.

You have been given $\mathbf{\$ 4 5}$ and Arnold Zwinger has been given $\mathbf{\$ 0}$. What is the highest price, $\mathbf{\$ P}$, that you are willing to pay in order to increase Arnold Zwinger's earnings by $\mathbf{\$ 3 0}$ ?

I am willing to pay up to $\$ 12$ in order to increase Arnold Zwinger's earnings by $\mathbf{\$ 3 0}$.

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Helping Game - Decision Maker Screens (Named Partner - anonymous treatment)

## Facebook 2006 Game - Part 2

## Situation 3 - Transfer Game with Marylin Moon

Remember that if this situation is selected for payment neither you nor Marylin Moon will be informed that this situation has been selected, nor will Marylin Moon be informed about your decision. Both you and Marylin Moon will be paid according to the decisions you made in this situation.

You have been given $\mathbf{\$ 4 5}$ and Marylin Moon has been given $\mathbf{\$ 0}$. What is the highest price, $\mathbf{\$ P}$, that you are willing to pay in order to increase Marylin Moon's earnings by $\mathbf{\$ 3 0}$ ?

I am willing to pay up to $\$ 14$ in order to increase Marylin Moon's earnings by $\mathbf{\$ 3 0}$.


Helping Game - Decision Maker Screens (Named Partner - anonymous treatment)

## Facebook 2006 Game - Part 2

## Situation 4 - Transfer Game with Kate Bloch

Remember that if this situation is selected for payment neither you nor Kate Bloch will be informed that this situation has been selected, nor will Kate Bloch be informed about your decision. Both you and Kate Bloch will be paid according to the decisions you made in this situation.

You have been given $\mathbf{\$ 4 5}$ and Kate Bloch has been given $\mathbf{\$ 0}$. What is the highest price, $\mathbf{\$ P}$, that you are willing to pay in order to increase Kate Bloch's earnings by $\mathbf{\$ 3 0}$ ?

I am willing to pay up to $\$ 16 \quad$ in order to increase Kate Bloch's earnings by $\mathbf{\$ 3 0}$.

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## Facebook 2006 Game - Part 2

## Instructions

Welcome back to the Facebook 2006 Experiment! This is the second part of this three-part experiment. You must complete all parts of the experiment to receive your earnings.

As before, you are presented today with a sequence of "situations". Please read the instructions carefully. Notice that each situation is different.

Please remember that you can only be paid for at most one situation from the following sequence, but that each situation has a chance of being implemented.

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## Facebook 2006 Game - Part 2

## Instructions

In each of the following four situations you will be matched with one specific student at Harvard to play the transfer game which you might remember from the first part.

We will always tell you the name of the other student. If that situation is randomly selected for payment both you and the other student will be informed that this situation has been selected, and the other player will be informed about your decision.

In each situation you will be given $\$ 45$ and the other student will be given $\$ 0$. We will then ask for the highest price, $\$ P$, that you would be willing to pay in order to increase the other student's earnings by $\$ 30$. We will randomly select a price $\$ P$ between $\$ 0$ and $\$ 30$, and if this price $\$ P$ is smaller than or equal to the maximum price you are willing to pay then we will subtract $\$ P$ from your earnings and add $\$ 30$ to the earnings of the student that you are paired with. Otherwise, your earnings will be $\$ 45$ and that student's earnings will be $\$ 0$.

There is a small probability that the student that you are matched with will be offered an opportunity to either (a) select to receive a payoff which ranges anywhere between $\$ 0$ and $\$ 30$ instead of playing the transfer game with you or (b) choose to play the transfer game with somebody else instead of playing the transfer game with you. One of these possibilities will be available to the other student with probability $20 \%$ or 1 out of 5 . If the student decides to get a payoff or play with another player, you will keep your $\$ 45$, regardless of the price $\$ P$ that you choose on the following screens. Since in most cases, the other student cannot make a selection or a choice, your choice of $\$ \mathrm{P}$ will in most cases determine both your and the other student's earnings.

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Helping Game - Decision Maker Screens (Named Partner - non-anonymous treatment)

## Facebook 2006 Game - Part 2

## Situation 1 - Transfer Game with Katherine Thompson

Remember that if this situation is selected for payment both you and Katherine Thompson will be informed that this situation has been selected and Katherine Thompson will be informed about your decision.

You have been given $\mathbf{\$ 4 5}$ and Katherine Thompson has been given $\mathbf{\$ 0}$. What is the highest price, $\mathbf{\$ P}$, that you are willing to pay in order to increase Katherine Thompson's earnings by $\mathbf{\$ 3 0}$ ?

I am willing to pay up to $\mathbf{\$} \quad$ in order to increase Katherine Thompson's earnings by $\mathbf{\$ 3 0}$.

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Helping Game - Decision Maker Screens (Named Partner - non-anonymous treatment)

## Facebook 2006 Game - Part 2

## Situation 2 - Transfer Game with Michael James

Remember that if this situation is selected for payment both you and Michael James will be informed that this situation has been selected and Michael J ames will be informed about your decision.

You have been given $\mathbf{\$ 4 5}$ and Michael James has been given $\mathbf{\$ 0}$. What is the highest price, $\mathbf{\$ P}$, that you are willing to pay in order to increase Michael J ames's earnings by $\mathbf{\$ 3 0}$ ?

I am willing to pay up to $\$ 4$ in order to increase Michael James's earnings by $\mathbf{\$ 3 0}$.

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Helping Game - Decision Maker Screens (Named Partner - non-anonymous treatment)

## Facebook 2006 Game - Part 2

## Situation 3 - Transfer Game with Florence Evina-Ze

Remember that if this situation is selected for payment both you and Florence Evina-Ze will be informed that this situation has been selected and Florence Evina-Ze will be informed about your decision.

You have been given $\mathbf{\$ 4 5}$ and Florence Evina-Ze has been given $\mathbf{\$ 0}$. What is the highest price, $\mathbf{\$ P}$, that you are willing to pay in order to increase Florence Evina-Ze's earnings by \$30?

I am willing to pay up to $\$ 6$ in order to increase Florence Evina-Ze's earnings by $\mathbf{\$ 3 0}$.

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Helping Game - Decision Maker Screens (Named Partner - non-anonymous treatment)

## Facebook 2006 Game - Part 2

## Situation 4 - Transfer Game with J oshua Samuelson

Remember that if this situation is selected for payment both you and Joshua Samuelson will be informed that this situation has been selected and Joshua Samuelson will be informed about your decision.

You have been given $\mathbf{\$ 4 5}$ and Joshua Samuelson has been given $\mathbf{\$ 0}$. What is the highest price, $\mathbf{\$ P}$, that you are willing to pay in order to increase Joshua Samuelson's earnings by $\mathbf{\$ 3 0}$ ?

I am willing to pay up to $\$ 8$ $\square$ in order to increase Joshua Samuelson's earnings by $\mathbf{\$ 3 0}$.



[^0]:    Press HERE to Start

[^1]:    Introduce Player 1/Player 2 pair

[^2]:    Predict in second situation

[^3]:    Goto next pair and make your 2nd out of 7 predictions

